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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A young child is dead.  The death occurred because the parents refused to take 
their child to a doctor.  Now, ordinarily, this refusal to obtain medical attention for a 
dying child would result in immediate indictments against the parents for involuntary 
manslaughter.  But what if the parents are Christian Scientists?  This question of 
whether Scientists should be treated differently because of their faith is a very 
controversial one in America today.2  If we allow the Scientists to practice their 
religion without government interference, children who could be medically treated 
and possibly saved may die.  If, on the other hand, we step in to protect the children, 
we are infringing on the parent’s right to freedom of religion.  On its face this may 
seem like an easy dilemma to settle; save the children.  But constitutionally and 
practically it is not.  Many have doubts as to the constitutionality of requiring 
Scientists to obtain medical attention for their children.3  Still others see no point in 
bringing forth prosecutions for the child’s death because the parents are already 
grieving.4  The current trend, though, is to bring manslaughter prosecutions, obtain 
convictions, and set prison sentences.5   
                                                                
2Donna K. LeClair, Faith-Healing and Religious-Treatment Exemptions to Child-
Endangerment Laws: Should Parental Religious Practices Excuse the Failure to Provide 
Necessary Medical Care to Children?, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 79, 80 (1987). 
3Eric W. Treene, Prayer –Treatment Exemptions to Child Abuse and Neglect Statutes, 
Manslaughter Prosecutions, and Due Process of Law, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 135, 135 (1993). 
4Treene, supra note 3, at 135. 
5Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988); People v. Rippberger, 283 Cal. Rptr. 
111 (Cal. 1991); Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 497 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
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II.  WHAT IS SCIENTISM? 
A.  Historically 
Mary Baker Eddy founded the Church of Christ, Scientist, in 1879 and there are 
now over 3,000 branch churches around the world.6  One of the central tenets of the 
faith is that healing comes through prayer, not through medicine.7  As Steven 
Schneider noted, “Christian Science today teaches that disease exists only because 
the mind, believing itself diseased, inflicts the illness on the body.  The way to 
minister to such disease is to remove the error of thinking that the disease exists.  To 
the Christian Scientist, medicine is not the means of cure.”8   
“According to Eddy, ‘Jesus proved by his deeds that Christian Science 
destroys sickness, sin and death.’9  Thus healing results from drawing 
close to God by following a way of life involving deep prayer, moral 
regeneration, and an effort to live in accord with the teachings and spirit 
of the Bible.”10 
There is very little confusion as to how Scientists view the use of prayer in 
healing.  Where there is considerable confusion, both for Scientists and non-
Scientists alike, is how the Church views members who use medicine anyway.  
Church doctrine does not regard the use of medicine as sin.11  Rather, medicine is 
discouraged simply because it perpetuates the error in thinking and delays the sick 
from discovering the truth of their faith.12  Doctrine in no way suggests that using 
modern medicine will result in damnation or the loss of eternal salvation.13   
B.  In Modern Times 
Many current practitioners of Christian Science, though, have noticed a shift in 
thinking from Ms. Eddy’s teachings.14  Members have noted the strong pressure 
exerted against them by the Church not to use medical procedures,15 and the strong 
                                                                
6Janna C. Merrick, Christian Science Healing of Minor Children: Spiritual Exemption 
Statutes, First Amendment Rights, and Fair Notice, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 321, 325 (1994).   
7Merrick, supra note 6, at 325. 
8Steven Schneider, Christian Science and the Law: Room for Compromise?, 1 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 81, 81 (1965). 
9MARY BAKER EDDY, SCIENCE AND HEALTH WITH KEY TO THE SCRIPTURES 26 (1890). 
10Merrick, supra note 6, at 326.   
11Schneider, supra note 8, at 87. 
12Id. at 88. 
13Id.  
14Henry J. Abraham, Abraham, Isaac and the State: Faith-Healing and Legal Intervention, 
27 U. RICH. L. REV. 951, 967 (1993). 
15Merrick, supra note 6, at 327 (Rita Swan, a former Scientist, was forced to resign from 
her Church offices and placed on “probation” after using professional doctors to remove a cyst 
from her ovary). 
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pressure they exert against themselves that to use medicine is to fail both God and 
their faith.16  In fact, current teaching has placed such a focus on faith-healing that 
many members feel that “[a] vigorous legal prohibition of all faith-healing practices 
might destroy Christian Science altogether.”17  To these Scientists, nothing less than 
the parents’ and child’s eternal salvation is on the line when decisions on how to 
treat the sick child are made.18   
Is it any wonder then that many Scientist parents make the choice they do?  
However incredible each of us thinks this faith may be, try for just one minute to put 
yourself into their shoes.  You have a sincere belief that only God, not doctors, can 
truly heal your child.  This belief of yours is equivalent in force to a Christian’s 
belief in the need for sin confession.  You believe that calling a doctor will be the act 
banishing you and your child to Hell for all eternity, just as a Christian who didn’t 
ask for forgiveness would obtain a reservation in Hell.  And besides, you don’t think 
the doctors will be able to help anyway.  You’d be treating your child according to 
society’s standards, not what you thought was correct and most beneficial.  How 
many of you, under those circumstances, would turn your backs on your faith in 
order to oblige the surrounding community?  This is a decision that Christian 
Scientists have been facing since 1879, and will continue to face for the foreseeable 
future.   
Unfortunately for Scientists, the majority of other Americans don’t see much of a 
choice here.  What they see are parents making their children martyrs to their own 
religious beliefs.19  Should the rest of America have any say, though, in these 
Scientists’ medical decisions?  What about the right to free exercise of one’s 
religion?  What about the right to due process of law?  How does public policy enter 
the controversy?  Should Scientists adapt their faiths to modern society’s standards?  
These are all questions that need to be answered to come to a resolution on this issue.  
And these are all questions that will be discussed in this Article. 
III.  THE SCOPE OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE – A HISTORY 
A.  A Hard View of Free Exercise by the Court  
We need to begin our analysis by determining the level of scrutiny the courts 
apply to this type of free exercise litigation.  The U.S. Constitution provides in the 
First Amendment that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion.”20  It wasn’t until Reynolds v. United States, though, in 1878 that the 
                                                                
16Abraham, supra note 14, at 967. 
17Id. at 967. 
18Paula A. Monopoli, Allocating the Costs of Parental Free Exercise: Striking a New 
Balance Between Sincere Religious Belief  and a Child’s Right to Medical Treatment, 18 PEPP. 
L. REV. 319, 335 (1991). 
19Merrick, supra note 6, at 325. 
20U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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Supreme Court first examined the scope of this clause to determine whether it would 
be enforced to the extent of its plain language.21   
In Reynolds, Congress had passed legislation forbidding the practice of 
polygamy.22  George Reynolds, a Mormon, claimed this law was an infringement on 
his Mormon duty to practice polygamy.23  The Court found his freedom of religion 
had not been violated.24  After looking at the historical underpinnings to the 
amendment’s creation, the Court ruled that Congress was only prohibited from 
regulating religious beliefs, not actions.25  As Laura Plastine has observed, “the Court 
identified two concepts embodied within the Free Exercise Clause – the right to 
believe and the right to act in accordance with that belief.”26  While the right to 
believe was to be given absolute protection by the First Amendment, Congress was 
allowed to regulate religiously motivated conduct.27  So under Reynolds it is 
conceivable that Congress or the states could limit the Scientists’ beliefs in faith-
healing to the realm of belief, and not allow their faith to be acted upon. 
In 1944, Prince v. Massachusetts came before the Supreme Court.28  Sarah Prince 
was convicted of violating state child labor laws after providing her niece with 
religious materials to distribute.29  Prince argued that both the Free Exercise Clause 
of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
protected her actions.30  The Supreme Court affirmed her conviction after balancing 
her interests “against the state’s interest in protecting the health and welfare of its 
children.”31  The Court reasoned that the rights to religious freedom and parenting 
were subject to regulation, and that neither was an absolute freedom under all 
circumstances.32  Taking the analysis one step further the Court noted that “[t]he 
right to practice religion freely does not include the liberty to expose the community 
or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.”33  Under this 
analysis, the Christian Science beliefs would again probably be open to regulation.  
                                                                
21Laura M. Plastine, “In God We Trust”: When Parents Refuse Medical Treatment For 
Their Children Based Upon Their Sincere Religious Beliefs, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 123, 
125-26 (1993). 
22Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 146 (1878). 
23Id. at 161. 
24Id. at 168. 
25Id. at 166. 
26Plastine, supra note 21, at 126.   
27Id.  
28Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
29Id. at 160. 
30Id. at 164 (Ms. Prince argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
was invoked by her parental rights). 
31Plastine, supra note 21, at 129.  See also Prince, 321 U.S. at 165 (1944). 
32Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. 
33Id. at 167 (citing People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243 (N.Y. 1903)). 
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The Supreme Court, though, would find its interpretation of the Free Exercise clause 
changing in the coming years. 
B.  A Change in Philosophy from the Court 
Sherbert v. Verner brought a change in analysis from the Court in 1963.34  
Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist, was fired from her job after refusing to work on 
Saturdays, her Sabbath.35  After failing to find new employment, she filed for 
unemployment compensation.36  The State of South Carolina rejected her claim, 
saying that she disqualified herself from benefits by refusing to work on Saturdays 
without good cause.37  The U.S. Supreme Court held that  Sherbert’s constitutional 
right to free exercise of religion had been violated.38  The Court relied upon Justice 
Murphy’s dissent from Prince v. Massachusetts in holding that, as Laura Plastine 
states, “a state cannot legitimately burden one’s free exercise of religion unless it can 
demonstrate that its regulation is the least restrictive means of achieving a 
compelling state interest.”39  In this analysis the balance is tipped in favor of 
protecting free exercise, and the burden lies with the state to show that no less 
restrictive means of achieving the state interest are available.40   
Plastine further observed that “[w]ith these words, the scope of the Free Exercise 
Clause was substantially broadened, for Sherbert clearly repudiated the belief-action 
dichotomy by requiring states to meet the ‘compelling state interest/least restrictive 
means’ test when a state law burdens religious conduct.”41  This case signaled a 
change in free exercise interpretation by the Court.  For the first time, the Court went 
out of its way to protect a citizen’s freedom of religion at the expense of state 
regulation.  Free Exercise would find itself even more protection nine years later in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder.42 
Yoder signifies, quite possibly, the Court’s broadest interpretation of the Free 
Exercise Clause.43  In Yoder, several Amish parents were convicted for not sending 
their children to school beyond the eighth grade.44  Wisconsin had a state statute 
                                                                
34Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
35Id. at 399. 
36Id. at 399-400. 
37Id. at 401. 
38Id. at 402. 
39Plastine, supra note 21, at 130.  Justice Murphy reasoned in his Prince v. Massachusetts 
dissent that “[r]eligious freedom is too sacred a right to be restricted or prohibited in any 
degree without convincing proof that a legitimate interest of the state is in grave danger.”  
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 176 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).  See also 
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (1963). 
40Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407. 
41Plastine, supra note 21, at 131. 
42Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
43Plastine, supra note 21, at 131-32. 
44Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207. 
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compelling school attendance for all children until the age of sixteen.45  The parents 
argued that this statute was a violation of their freedom of religion.46  According to 
the Amish, sending their children to high school would not only bring church 
censure upon the parents, but would also endanger both the parents’ and child’s 
opportunities for salvation.47  This danger existed because of the Amish belief that 
“high school tends to emphasize intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-
distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other students.”48  
On the other hand, “Amish society emphasizes learning-through-doing; a life of 
‘goodness,’ rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge; 
community welfare, rather than competition; and separation from, rather than 
integration with, contemporary worldly society.”49 
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to reverse the 
convictions.50  In doing so, the Court continued to use the Sherbert balancing test.51  
Also, the Court again rejected a return to the Reynolds distinction between regulation 
of conduct and regulation of belief.52  However, what most broadened free exercise 
interpretation was the Court’s willingness to invalidate the facially neutral statute.53  
With this decision the Court effectively told states that, even when enacting facially 
neutral statutes, they still had a duty to accommodate religious objectors with 
exceptions if the objectors’ beliefs and acts were infringed by the legislation.54  Is it 
possible that this level of protection would have been enough for Christian Scientists 
to gain exempt status from these prosecutions?  Unfortunately for Scientists, we may 
never know as the Court took a sharp turn in the 1980’s and began chipping away at 
the degree of protection it had previously provided.55  
C.  A Reversal Back to Original Thinking 
The current level of protection afforded to the free exercise of religion is 
illustrated in the 1990 decision of Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources v. Smith.56  Oregon law prohibited the possession of controlled substances 
unless a doctor had prescribed the substance.57  Alfred Smith was fired from his job, 
                                                                
45Id. 
46Id. at 208-09. 
47Id. at 209. 
48Id. at 211. 
49Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211. 
50Id. at 213. 
51Id. at 214. 
52Monopoli, supra note 18, at 339. 
53Id.  
54Plastine, supra note 21, at 132. 
55Id.  
56Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
57Id. at 874. 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
486 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:479 
ironically with a drug rehabilitation center, after ingesting peyote during a Native 
American Church ceremony.58  Smith then applied for unemployment compensation, 
but was denied because he had been fired for work-related “misconduct.”59  Smith 
contended that the state’s refusal to compensate him was a violation of his freedom 
of religion.60  The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that exemptions do not need to 
be made for religious objectors when facially neutral statutes are at issue.61  The 
Court concluded, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, that “the right to free exercise of 
religion does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and 
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or 
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”62   
Scalia then went on to distinguish past precedent from the case before him.63  He 
held that past cases (like Wisconsin v. Yoder) involved not only free exercise claims, 
but also other constitutional protections such as the right of parents to direct their 
child’s education.64  Only when these “hybrid situations” arose would a facially 
neutral statute need to withstand strict scrutiny analysis.65  In all other claims dealing 
with facially neutral statutes, a “rational basis” analysis was to be used.66  No longer 
would the state need to demonstrate its statute was the least restrictive mean to 
achieving a compelling state interest.67  What would probably turn out to be even 
more damaging to the Christian Scientist effort, though, was the Court’s return to the 
belief/action dichotomy.68  This distinction, first recognized in Reynolds, stripped 
away much of the protection that had been given to religious objectors since Prince 
v. Massachusetts.69 
IV.  FREE EXERCISE AND THE CHRISTIAN SCIENTIST ARGUMENTS 
A.  Manslaughter Statutes – Facially Neutral or Discriminatory? 
With that background, we now know where we stand with free exercise claims 
and what needs to be shown to obtain relief.  To gain maximum protection, the 
Scientists need to invoke a second fundamental right in addition to their free exercise 
claim.70  This done, the facially neutral legislation cannot stand unless the state’s 
                                                                
58Id.  
59Id.  
60Id.  
61Id. at 878-79. 
62Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. 
63Id. at 881. 
64Id.  See also Monopoli, supra note 18, at 341. 
65Plastine, supra note 21, at 136-37. 
66Smith, 494 U.S. at 885. 
67Plastine, supra note 21, at 137. 
68Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. 
69Plastine, supra note 21, at 137. 
70Monopoli, supra note 18, at 341. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss3/5
2000] THE PROSECUTION OF CHRISTIAN SCIENTISTS 487 
compelling interest is sought through the least restrictive means possible.71  If a 
second right is not raised along with the First Amendment claim, the Court will only 
perform a “rational basis” review of the legislation.72    
However, this analysis only takes place if the statute is facially neutral.73  If the 
statute is facially discriminatory, a strict scrutiny review will immediately attach to 
the discriminatory law and our analysis becomes much easier.74  So we first need to 
examine the types of laws typically involved in these Scientist prosecutions.  Florida 
has a fairly typical involuntary manslaughter statute.  Section 782.07 of the Florida 
Statutes provides: 
The killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or culpable 
negligence of another, without lawful justification, and in cases in which 
such killing shall not be excusable homicide or murder, shall be deemed 
manslaughter and shall constitute a felony of the second degree.75 
This appears to be a neutral statute.  Basically the statute provides that if your 
negligence causes another’s death, then you are liable for manslaughter.76  There is 
no mention of discrimination.77  No exceptions are made for certain types of 
negligence.78  The statute lays out a simple rule which, on its face, applies equally to 
anyone who negligently kills another.  And if nothing else could establish the general 
neutrality of manslaughter statutes around the country, thousands of convictions of 
non-Scientists every year should do the job.   
B.  The Need for Two Constitutional Encroachments  
The facial neutrality of these manslaughter statutes being relatively clear, 
Scientists should not waste much time arguing otherwise.  Their efforts would be 
better devoted to establishing a second constitutional violation beyond free exercise, 
thereby creating a higher burden for the state to overcome.79  If the defendant fails to 
show this second infringement, the manslaughter statute will stand so long as the 
court finds it to be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.80  In other words, 
so long as the state can show that these prosecutions could help save children’s lives 
(such as through deterrence), the rational basis test is satisfied.  Scientists will not 
win this argument.  Their only chance at a successful defense is to force the 
government to pass a strict scrutiny analysis, and that can only happen if they come 
up with two constitutional encroachments brought about by the prosecution.   
                                                                
71Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
72Id. at 885. 
73Id. at 877. 
74Id.  
75FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.07 (West 1992). 
76Id. 
77Id.  
78Id.  
79Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
80City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985). 
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1.  Infringement of the Free Exercise of Religion 
The first constitutional right invoked by Christian Scientists is obviously the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  Scientists, as a defense to these 
prosecutions, routinely argue that this clause provides them with absolute protection 
from criminal liability for actions arising from their religious beliefs.81  The courts 
have not agreed that this absolute protection exists,82 which is why Scientists are not 
allowed to practice their faith as they want.83  They are being prosecuted for 
following their beliefs that only prayer can help the child.84  They are being 
convicted because they refuse to accept society’s trust in medical treatment.85  
Basically, they are being punished because they follow their love of God, and what 
they feel God has instructed them to do.86  According to Henry Abraham, Scientists 
view faith-healing as a “silent yielding of self to God,”87 as a “necessary element in 
the redemption from the flesh and in the overcoming of the mental illusions of pain 
and disease.”88  By punishing Scientists for holding these beliefs and acting on them, 
society is certainly encroaching on the free exercise of their faith.   
Most criminal sanctions today are imposed because the state wants to deter some 
type of behavior on which it looks unkindly.89  Under this assumption, punishments 
are handed out to Scientists in an effort to deter them from acting on their faith, 
because the state thinks their faith is not worth the costs of children’s lives.90  
Whether states have the right to this deterrent is the ultimate issue. 
2.  Infringement of the Fundamental Right to Parenting 
The second fundamental right potentially violated by these prosecutions is the 
right to parenting.91  Parents have long held the right to direct their child’s education, 
upbringing, and lifestyle.92  Donna LeClair observed that “[t]he care and keeping of 
children is an inherent responsibility of parenthood and an obligation well-
                                                                
81Plastine, supra note 21, at 150. 
82Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988); People v. Ripperberger, 231, 283 
Cal. Rptr. 111 (1991); Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 497 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
83Plastine, supra note 21, at 150. 
84Id.  
85Merrick, supra note 6, at 325. 
86Abraham, supra note 14, at 967. 
87Id.  
88Id.  
89Judith Inglis Scheiderer, When Children Die as a Result of Religious Practices, 51 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1429, 1443 (1990). 
90Scheiderer, supra note 89, at 1443. 
91Jennifer L. Rosato, Putting Square Pegs in a Round Hole:  Procedural Due Process and 
the Effect of Faith Healing Exemptions on the Prosecution of Faith Healing Parents, 29 
U.S.F. L. REV. 43, 79 (1994). 
92LeClair, supra note 2, at 98.  
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established by common and statutory law.”93  Both the courts and states have 
recognized this responsibility and have made every effort to protect the privacy of 
the family.94  Virtually everyone agrees that parents have the best understanding of 
their child’s needs and wants.95  Courts have repeatedly held that the “custody, care 
and nurture [of children] reside first in the parents,”96 and that included in this right 
to parenting is the authority to make decisions regarding the child’s medical needs.97  
Couldn’t the argument be made, then, that these religious parents would know better 
than anyone else what the best form of treatment is for the sick child?  And that, with 
the history behind parental rights, the Scientists should be given more freedom to 
direct their child’s upbringing, to control their medical needs, and to have a little 
privacy for familial decisions?   
The states don’t think so.98  And frequent prosecutions are the evidence.  But 
when a state begins to judge the actions someone has taken as a parent, isn’t it 
crossing its self-drawn line separating family from state?  And when the state sets as 
a condition of conviction that the parent must use medical doctors with future 
children,99 isn’t it penetrating the border then?  When Scientists have “Big Brother” 
looking over their shoulders at their parental job, they clearly are not free to do as 
they wish.  When Scientists are compelled to take their child to the doctor, against 
their faith and better judgment, they are not being given the complete authority over 
the child’s upbringing talked about in the Supreme Court’s past decisions.  These 
prosecutions are controls over the Scientists as parents, and they surely influence the 
decisions made.   
V.  FREE EXERCISE AND THE STATE’S ARGUMENTS 
The free exercise of religion and the right to parenting are the two separate 
fundamental rights violated by these prosecutions.  I don’t think many people would 
argue that these rights aren’t infringed upon; I certainly think Scientists’ rights are 
being sacrificed for state concerns.  The question now is, is that sacrifice justified?  
The overwhelming answer from both scholars and the courts is yes. 
                                                                
93Id. at 98. 
94Scheiderer, supra note 89, at 1444. 
95Id.  
96LeClair, supra note 2, at 98. 
97Ann MacLean Massie, The Religion Clauses and Parental Health Care Decision-
Making for Children:  Suggestions for a New Approach, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 725, 773 
(1994). 
98Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1992); State v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63 
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A.  States Do Have a Justifying Factor for Infringing on Scientists’ Rights – Saving 
Children 
Remember that states need to have a compelling state interest, achieved through 
the least restrictive means possible, because two constitutional rights are implicated 
by these prosecutions.100  Fortunately for the state, just such an interest exists.101  As 
noted by David Tate, courts have consistently held that “[t]he parents’ right to 
practice their religion simply is not paramount to the child’s right to life.”102  The 
state has an earnest and significant interest in protecting the lives and welfare of its 
youth.103  The Supreme Court has held previously that state interests do not take 
priority over a parent’s right to inculcate his or her child with the parent’s values.104  
But the Court has routinely drawn the line when the indoctrination endangers the 
child’s life.105   
In the California case of People v. Rippberger, Mark Rippberger and Susan 
Middleton were parents to an 8-month old infant named Natalie.106  Natalie became 
sick on November 24, 1984.107  On December 2, a Christian Science nurse was 
summoned to the defendants’ home.108  For the next week this nurse cared for 
Natalie, “sleeping, praying, reading scriptures, and ‘voicing the truth to the baby.’”109  
On December 9, Natalie died of bacterial meningitis,110 a disease that is treatable 
with penicillin.111   
The defendants argued at trial that 
because resort to conventional medical care constitutes an admission that 
illness is real, contrary to the most central belief of Christian Science that 
illness is not real, any effort by the state to force Christian Science parents 
such as appellants to provide medical care for their children will 
inevitably result in  the destruction of the religion of Christian Science 
itself.112   
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12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss3/5
2000] THE PROSECUTION OF CHRISTIAN SCIENTISTS 491 
California’s Court of Appeals held that the state’s right to protect the lives of 
children outweighed the Scientists’ rights to practice their beliefs free from 
government control.113  The court went on to hold that the right to free exercise of 
religion was not an absolute right, and that it needed to be balanced against the rights 
of others, including one’s own children.114  The court concluded that to hold 
otherwise would be an insult to the First Amendment.115   
In a Maryland case, Craig v. State, the defendants had a six month old daughter, 
Elaine.116  Elaine was ill for eighteen days prior to her death, having received only 
religious treatment in place of medical treatment.117  It was discovered after an 
autopsy that Elaine had died of pneumonia, another illness treatable with 
antibiotics.118  The father testified that the only reason medical treatment was not 
provided to Elaine was due to their religious convictions; they followed the “Word of 
God.”119 
Maryland’s Court of Appeals held that this devout belief in the “Word of God” 
was not sufficient to avoid prosecution.120  The court quoted a passage from Reynolds 
v. United States as its centerpiece:  “Laws are made for the government of actions, 
and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may 
with practices.”121  The court continued to subscribe to the belief/action dichotomy 
throughout the rest of its analysis, holding that while the freedom to believe was 
absolutely protected, the right to act was not.122  Under this analysis, the court ruled 
that the state’s interest in protecting the “peace, health and good order of the 
community” was a valid reason to infringe on the Craigs’ rights to free exercise.123  
Manslaughter laws were created for the benefit of all society, for the protection and 
safety of others.124  The court saw no reason to provide the religious with defenses to 
these beneficial laws, regardless of the strength of their beliefs.125   
The California case of Walker v. Superior Court may be the most damaging case 
to the Scientist cause.  The decision included some of the strongest language against 
the free exercise argument that has been seen to date.126  The California Supreme 
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Court noted that Scientists would be foolish to argue that the state interest of saving 
children lacks significance.127  The court found no state interest to be more 
compelling than protecting our children “upon whose ‘healthy, well-rounded growth 
. . . into full maturity as citizens’ our ‘democratic society rests, for its continuance 
. . .”
128
  The Walker court used the Prince v. Massachusetts analysis as its 
centerpiece.129  To recap, Prince had held that parents did not have the right to turn 
their children into martyrs to the parents’ religious faith.130  And Prince was dealing 
with child labor laws.131  Using the Prince court’s protection of children from 
religion-induced labor, the Walker court felt it was only logical to extend that same 
protection to children allowed to die.132  The court stated that “[i]f parents are not at 
liberty to ‘martyr’ children by taking their labor, it follows a fortiori that they are not 
at liberty to martyr children by taking their lives.”133 
The court also took into consideration the church doctrine regarding medicine.134  
The justices thought it was quite significant that Scientist doctrine does not regard 
the use of medicine as sin.135  Whatever the individual members may have thought, 
or may have interpreted their faith as requiring, the court was influenced by the 
church’s admission that members were not compelled to use faith-healing.136  No 
religious penalties arose from the use of medicine, and  the church supposedly would 
not stigmatize the failing member.137  The court adopted the view that if the church 
did not mandate faith-healing, then no free exercise claim could really stand.138 
As the Walker court stated, someone would be hard-pressed to argue that 
protecting children isn’t a compelling state interest, justifying infringement of 
Scientists’ rights to free exercise.  But the state still needs to get past the fundamental 
right to parenting that is also raised in the context of these prosecutions.  As will be 
seen shortly, the same state interest of protecting children will also be deemed 
sufficient by any court to encroach upon this right. 
B.  Justification for Violating the Right to Parenting – Again It’s Saving Children 
Although historically the Courts have gone out of their way to protect the privacy 
of families, “the family itself is not beyond regulation.”139  The state has a duty to its 
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citizens to oversee the general welfare of children through its role as parens 
patriae.140  While the state hopes to stay out of family affairs and allow parents to 
raise their children as they see fit, the state does have the authority to intervene on a 
child’s behalf when it feels the parents are not fulfilling their obligations to the 
child.141  As was stated in a juvenile action, “the child is entitled to have his or her 
basic needs cared for.  If the parent fails to furnish these needs, the state may and 
should act on behalf of the child.”142 
Don’t our minor children need this degree of protection?  Children don’t have the 
ability to protect themselves or the authority to make decisions for themselves.  In 
fact, their lives rest in the hands of their parents (to a great extent).  I fully appreciate 
the parents’ interest in dictating a lifestyle to their children.  This child will go 
through life with their name, their life-blood and their influence.  It is only natural to 
want your child to adopt the same values and beliefs you have adopted.  But I don’t 
believe a child should have to die as part of the indoctrination.  States have always 
made it a point to protect our children, and have in the process set out guidelines for 
parents to follow.143  Parents abuse their freedom when they fail to provide adequate 
medical care to children.144  This failure not only entitles the state to intervene on the 
child’s behalf, but it demands it.145  Many scholars feel a parents’ motivations for not 
providing medical care are completely irrelevant.146  What matters to these people are 
the rights and well-being of the child, end of story.147 
Again, this state interest in protecting its youth will invariably be deemed 
sufficient for the “compelling interest” component of the strict scrutiny analysis.  So 
long as the state’s means of achieving the interest are only as restrictive as necessary, 
the Scientists will not have a winnable free exercise claim. 
C.  Are There Less Restrictive Means of Achieving This Compelling Interest?  
Unfortunately for Scientists, the Walker court held that no less restrictive means 
of protecting the children exist than prosecuting these parents.148  The Walker 
defendants argued that children could be just as well protected with civil 
proceedings, such as removing children from the home of parents who are not 
providing adequate medical care.149  While unpopular with the particular parents, 
such an approach would certainly be less restrictive than placing other Scientists in 
jail or on probation.150  However, the California Supreme Court rebutted this 
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argument.151  The main reason was simple.  Courts can only remove children from 
unsafe homes if the child is still alive.152  And under most circumstances, the state 
will never even know that the child was in danger until the child has already died.153  
Until the child’s death when the parents contact the appropriate authorities, these 
faith-healing sessions are invariably conducted in private.154  With this knowledge, 
the court held that the only avenue remaining for the state was to conduct 
prosecutions after the fact.155  The rationale is that if the courts can’t help the 
endangered child, they can at least try to deter future Scientists from putting other 
children into similar situations.  If the courts cannot identify those children presently 
needing help, not much can be done for them.156  However, protection can be 
provided to other children not presently in danger, but who could be the next year.  
Those children are the subjects of state interest when prosecuting these cases. 
VI.  DUE PROCESS ARGUMENTS AND SCIENTISTS 
A.  What Are These Due Process Claims? 
Failing to avoid conviction on free exercise grounds, Scientists next tend to argue 
a due process claim.157  Basically, this argument involves the spiritual healing 
exemptions found in most states’ child neglect statutes.158  Literally read, many of 
these statutes would seem to provide immunity to parents whose children died as a 
result of faith-healing.159  For instance, Oklahoma’s statute on child endangerment 
provided: 
Unless otherwise provided for by law, any parent . . . who willfully omits, 
without lawful excuse, to perform any duty imposed upon such parent . . . 
to furnish necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical attention . . . is 
guilty of a misdemeanor.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
mean a child is endangered for the sole reason the parent or guardian, in 
good faith, selects and depends upon spiritual means alone through 
prayer, in accordance with the tenets and practice of a recognized church 
or religious denomination, for the treatment or cure of disease.160 
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It is understandable how Scientists could read the above statute and then be a 
little surprised when they are later indicted.  On its face the statute seems to provide 
protection to Scientists, so long as they were acting in good faith with their religion.  
But, as it turns out, this level of protection is not necessarily present. 
There are three primary due process problems brought about by these child-
neglect exemptions.  First, many times the manslaughter prosecutions use an 
underlying violation, like child neglect or endangerment, as their foundation for 
conviction.  The child neglect is the proof prosecutors need to convict for the 
manslaughter charge.  Well, if an exemption exists for the underlying “neglect”, then 
supposedly no violation took place.  If no violation took place, then presumably 
prosecutors should not be able to use the parent’s behavior as evidence in the 
manslaughter trials, and convictions should become non-existent.  Second, Scientists 
oftentimes argue that if manslaughter statutes use as a foundation an underlying 
violation, then the underlying violation’s exemption should also be incorporated into 
the manslaughter statute, regardless of whether or not it explicitly provides one.161  
The third problem, as noted by Jennifer Rosato, is that “even if the faith healing 
exemption is not actually incorporated into the manslaughter or homicide statute, due 
process may bar the parents’ prosecution because they were not adequately notified 
of the exemption’s limited scope.”162  In other words, the confusion caused by the 
inconsistent statutes prevents the Scientists from recognizing the potential liability 
attaching to their actions.  At times these arguments have worked, but generally 
speaking appellate courts still tend to be reluctant to reverse convictions.163 
B.  Can a Manslaughter Prosecution Exist if No Underlying Crime Was Committed?   
As outlined above, the first due process problem involves whether or not these 
manslaughter prosecutions can even exist if no underlying crime was committed.  
This was the question presented in State v. Lockhart, an Oklahoma case in which the 
defendants were acquitted.164  The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s reasoning in the 
state’s appeal was simple:  the manslaughter charge was based upon the child 
endangerment statute quoted earlier.165  The court held that the child endangerment 
statute was clear and unambiguous.166  An exemption was provided for parents who 
used faith-healing instead of medical treatment.167  Because no conviction could arise 
under the child endangerment statute, there was no underlying violation upon which 
the manslaughter prosecution could be premised.168  
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This argument appears to make a great deal of sense, but courts have routinely 
circumvented these underlying statutes.169  Either through striking down the 
exemptions in the underlying statutes or by substantially limiting their application to 
make them useless to Scientists, many courts have gone out of their way to get 
around this technicality.170  The California Supreme Court provides an example of 
this with its decision in Walker v. Superior Court.171  The Walker court ruled that the 
manslaughter prosecution could go forth because the existing faith-healing  
exemption only applied to misdemeanor child neglect.172  The Walkers were being 
prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter and felony child neglect.173  By limiting the 
child neglect exemption to only misdemeanor violations, the underlying violation for 
felony child neglect still existed and could still form the foundation for the 
manslaughter conviction.174 
C.  Are Child-Neglect Exemptions Incorporated into Manslaughter Statutes? 
Several Scientists have also argued that faith healing exemptions present in child-
neglect statutes are incorporated into the manslaughter statutes.175  Incorporation is 
very difficult to show, however.176  A court will only construe the two statutes 
together if it is “natural and reasonable” to believe the legislators intended the 
statutes to be construed together.177  When determining if a child-neglect exemption 
for faith-healing applies to a manslaughter charge, the court will generally consider 
whether the statutes refer to one another, whether the purposes of each are similar, 
and if the statutes were both passed during the same year.178  As can be imagined 
these criteria are rarely met, if ever.179 
The California case of Walker v. Superior Court also addressed this issue.  Laurie 
Walker asserted as a defense that California’s Penal Code section 270 provided her 
with immunity from the manslaughter charge.180  Section 270 was California’s 
misdemeanor child endangerment statute.  The 1872 statute provided that “[e]very 
parent of any child who willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to perform any duty 
imposed upon him by law, to furnish necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical 
attendance for such child, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”181  In 1976, the statute was 
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amended to specify that faith-healing constituted medical attendance.182  Walker 
claimed that she was exempted from manslaughter charges because the child 
endangerment statute gave Scientists the authority to treat children with faith-healing 
instead of doctors.183 
The Walker court disagreed with her on this point as well.184  The court reasoned 
that the two statutes, the manslaughter and child endangerment ones, had completely 
different purposes in mind.185  This difference in purpose prevented a parallel 
exemption in the manslaughter statute from existing.186  The purpose of the 
manslaughter statute was punishment of neglectful parents, while section 270 was 
enacted to “secure support of the child and to protect the public from the burden of 
supporting a child who has a parent able to support him.”187  Section 270 was 
designed for fiscal purposes, not retributive ones.188  As such, Walker could escape 
liability for endangering her child, but not if the child died. 
There are four common problems that are going to basically preclude Scientists 
from establishing incorporation of these exemptions.189  First, the child 
neglect/endangerment statutes very rarely refer to the manslaughter statutes.190  
Second, these statutes typically have different purposes in mind.191  Manslaughter 
statutes are written to protect society from dangerous persons, whereas child-neglect 
statutes are written to protect children from irresponsible or neglectful parents.192  A 
third problem Scientists might encounter deals with the fact that these statutes rarely 
get drafted during the same legislative session.193  Courts are much more likely to 
construe the statutes together if they were enacted during the same year.194  Finally, 
courts will probably find it very hard to believe that legislators provided exemptions 
for manslaughter convictions.195  Most likely, legislators who really wanted to 
provide an “out” for someone charged with allowing another’s death would 
explicitly say so, and not leave it up to incorporation. 
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D.  Are Scientists Provided With Fair Notice as to the Criminality of Their Actions? 
The final due process argument Scientists assert is that constructive, or fair, 
notice was lacking.  “Laws must be readily comprehensible to the ordinary person so 
that he may know when his conduct constitutes an offense.”196  Constructive notice is 
lacking when people of common intelligence need to guess at a statute’s meaning or 
disagree in their interpretations of it.197  If a person does not receive constructive 
notice that his or her actions are subject to criminal liability, then that person has a 
legitimate due process claim against the government.198  Scientists typically argue 
that the child-neglect exemptions gave them the impression that their use of faith-
healing was legal in all contexts.199  They are then surprised when they discover the 
exemption they relied on expired upon the child’s death.  Should Scientists escape 
punishment when they relied on another statute’s clear exemption?  The courts are 
divided. 
Commonwealth v. Twitchell raised this issue in the state of Massachusetts.200  
There the defendants relied on a statute providing that “[a] child shall not be deemed 
to be neglected or lack proper physical care for the sole reason that he is being 
provided remedial treatment by spiritual means alone.”201  After they provided faith-
healing to their son, he died, and they were subsequently charged with involuntary 
manslaughter.  The Twitchells argued that their rights to due process would be 
violated if the exemption were not extended to cover their actions because they 
lacked “fair warning” that the use of faith-healing could result in a prosecution.202   
The Massachusetts Supreme Court found it irrelevant that the defendants had 
relied on the child-neglect exemption.203  What mattered to the court was the very 
clear line drawn between manslaughter statutes and child-neglect statutes.204  The 
court found no “mixed signal” from the coexistence of the statutes.205  According to 
the court, “[t]he spiritual treatment provision protects against criminal charges of 
neglect and of willful failure to provide proper medical care and says nothing about 
protection against criminal charges based on wanton or reckless conduct.”206  The 
court went on to hold that losing the protection of an exemption at some unknown 
point does not in and of itself create a fair notice problem.207  Although the 
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Twitchells had lost the protection of the exemption without their knowledge, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court still did not feel they were denied fair notice of the 
criminal nature of their acts. 
However, the very fact that the defendants relied on the exemption, as common 
people, indicates that there was confusion and various interpretations of the statute.  
Basic logic dictates that if the defendants read it differently than both the judges and 
prosecutor, it must not be a completely unambiguous statute.  And if confusion 
existed over its scope, as it did, then a fair notice claim should be recognized.  At 
least the next two courts “got it right.” 
State v. McKown was a Minnesota case in which the defendants relied on an 
exemption to the child-neglect statute stating that parents would satisfy the “health 
care” requirements if they depended upon faith-healing for the treatment or cure of 
disease.208  The McKowns argued that this statute misled them to believe that they 
were protected in their actions.209  They argued that they did not receive fair notice 
that punishment could attach to actions taken which are specifically permitted under 
the exemption.210  The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the defendants.211  The 
court ruled that the child-neglect statute “expressly provided respondents the right to 
‘depend on’ Christian Science healing methods so long as they did so in good 
faith.”212  Because the Scientists had been authorized to rely on their faith-healing 
techniques, it would be a violation of their due process to convict them.213   
The Florida Supreme Court in Hermanson v. State held similarly.214  The 
Hermansons were also under the impression that their use of faith-healing was 
protected conduct.215  They were surprised to find out that their protection expired 
when their child passed away.216  The court understood their confusion, noting that 
even the lower courts were a little confused by the exemption.217  The court stated 
that one of the purposes of due process was to display to everyone exactly when 
one’s conduct becomes criminal.218  The court held that “[b]y authorizing conduct in 
one statute, but declaring that same conduct criminal under another statute, the state 
trapped the Hermansons, who had no fair warning that the state would consider their 
conduct criminal.”219  How could the Hermansons have been expected to realize the 
criminality of their behavior?  Even the lower courts could not figure out the 
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interrelationship of the child-neglect and manslaughter statutes, and yet the state 
presumed that the Hermansons would realize their conduct was potentially 
punishable.  The McKown and Hermanson courts reached more sensible conclusions 
in my opinion. 
VII.  PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS WITH PROSECUTIONS 
A.  Are There Any? 
If a Christian Scientist is on trial and he or she hasn’t convinced the judge of 
either the free exercise or due process argument, then he or she might as well pack a 
toothbrush because the next stop will be at jail.  There is one more argument that can 
be made against these prosecutions, though.  It is an argument which will be of no 
value to a Scientist already on trial, but which could be beneficial to future 
Scientists.  Many people have concerns with these prosecutions on public policy 
grounds.  Some feel that Scientists cannot be deterred from these acts because of 
their faith, so nothing is gained by using up jail space on them.  Others don’t want to 
pursue prosecutions because they feel the Scientists are already grieving.220  These 
people have adopted the philosophy that the child’s death was the worst punishment 
the parent could have received, and they should be released from liability on those 
grounds.  I will examine briefly each one of these public policy concerns.   
B.  Lack of Deterrence 
Some commentators have argued that Scientists will not be deterred by 
prosecutions of fellow Scientists.221  Let’s not forget that these are parents who 
literally watched their children die while exercising their faith. These critics argue 
that anyone who holds their faith so sacredly as to allow their child to die surely is 
not going to be influenced by a prison or probation sentence.222  And until 
researching the issue, I would have completely agreed with these scholars.  In the 
beginning, I thought these Scientists were so devoted to faith-healing that nothing 
could shake them from their beliefs, not even jail time.  But it turns out that 
historically they are willing to alter their beliefs to fit within the confines of the law. 
For instance, in Great Britain and Canada all children by law must be treated with 
conventional medicine.223  The Scientists began allowing all members in those 
countries to use medical treatment in order to avoid mass prosecution.224  Now, I 
understand that mass prosecution is a compelling influence, but the Scientist faith 
survived the change.  The church adapted to the changing law and stayed afloat, kept 
members, and remained true to its faith. 
One example of this survival is the British case of Regina v. Downes from 
1875.225  Although this was a case involving faith-healing by “Peculiar People” as 
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opposed to Scientists, the Scientist church was deeply impacted by the court’s 
decision.226  In Regina, a father was prosecuted for the deaths of his wife and 
newborn.227  He had not provided either with formal medical care and both died.228  
The British court convicted him under legislation that had just recently been 
passed.229  The British government, upset at an acquittal of two faith-healers seven 
years earlier in Regina v. Wagstaffe, had amended the existing manslaughter laws to 
make faith-healing alone a crime.230  In response to Downes’ conviction, the Scientist 
church began allowing families to use obstetricians and anesthesia in order to stay in 
compliance with the law.231   
Today’s Scientist church leaders have expressed a willingness to change, if need 
be.232  However, they of course do not want to, and earnestly believe that they are 
following God’s commands in acting as they do.  But they also recognize that 
parents should be able to take their children to a medical doctor if they desire.233  One 
church leader was even quoted as saying “Christian Scientists first and always obey 
the law.”234  So the question isn’t so much whether Scientists can alter their faith to 
fit within the law, but whether society should make them alter it. 
C.  Have the Parents Already Suffered Enough? 
Both the shortest and strongest argument against these prosecutions is the fact 
that the parents have already suffered a tremendous loss with their child’s death.  I 
don’t feel comfortable in pursuing prosecutions because these parents truly felt they 
were doing what was right.  They honestly did not feel that doctors would be able to 
help their child as well as prayer.  It would be like asking a non-Scientist to rely on 
faith-healing, even though you thought medicine would work better.  These were 
loving parents.  These were caring parents.  I can promise each of you that they hurt 
more for the lost child than society does.  I don’t see the benefit in subjecting them to 
further penalty.  Deterrence is a worthwhile objective, and I fully appreciate the lost 
deterrent effect not prosecuting could have on other children, but I know I’ll never 
bring charges as a District Attorney.  I couldn’t put the parents through it. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The beliefs of Christian Scientists are a growing concern to many Americans.  It 
is understandable.  Children have died as a result of Scientists’ faith-healing 
techniques, and as long as those techniques continue to be used more children will 
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likely die.  But Scientists are still fighting to hold on to their religion, and the right to 
exercise it freely.   
While courts will properly hold their free exercise claims, even when coupled 
with right to parent claims, as being insufficient when compared with the state’s 
interest in protecting children, Scientists do have other options.  Scientists have often 
been acquitted from involuntary manslaughter prosecutions on the basis of due 
process. Confused over the extent of faith-healing exemptions written into child-
neglect statutes, many Scientists rely to their detriment on those exemptions until 
their child passes.  Some courts have been sympathetic (again properly) to Scientists 
in these circumstances, while other courts have been unable to look past the deceased 
child. 
The final consideration is whether these prosecutions should happen in the first 
place.  While Scientists could likely be deterred from these acts, and would probably 
alter their religious practices to fit within the confines of the law, it just doesn’t feel 
right to many of us to bring charges in these cases.  The parents have suffered 
enough.  They’ve lost their child.  Everybody needs to move on.   
 
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss3/5
